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Appellants Richard C. Thompson and Paul C. Jensen on behalf of themselves and
all other similarly situated taxpayers (collectively "Taxpayers") through counsel
respectfully submit this Appellants' Brief.
JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from an order of the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, Third Judicial
District Court, dated May 13, 2003, granting Appellees' Motion to Dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (1953, as amended).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal raises one legal issue: Did the trial court err in concluding as a
matter of federal law that the State of Utah did not unlawfully discriminate against
federal retirees when it increased pension benefits for selected state retirees for the
express purpose of replacing (rebating) a portion of the additional income taxes paid by
such state retirees as a result of the repeal of an unlawful and discriminatory tax
exemption?
A trial court's dismissal for failure to state a claim is a question of law and
therefore the trial court's ruling is given no deference and the ruling is reviewed under a
correctness standard. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196
(Utah 1991).
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DETERMATIVE LAW
Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 4S9 U.S. 803 (1989) is determinative
of the issue stated.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case squarely presents an issue of whether form should be exalted over
substance.

The Utah State Tax Commission and the Utah State Retirement System

maintain that the State of Utah can properly do in form (through a selective increase in
state retirement benefits) what it admittedly cannot do in substance (discriminate in
taxation between federal and state retirees).
As of 1989, twenty-one states exempted retirees who received state retirement
benefits from paying state income tax on those benefits, while at the same time levying a
state income tax on retirees who received benefits from federal retirement systems. That
discriminatory state of affairs ended in 1989 with the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989). The
Supreme Court in Davis held that a state tax system which treats federal retirees worse
than state retirees violates the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity
which is based on the Supremacy Clause.
Some states resisted implementation of Davis, and refused refunds for pre-1989
years to federal retirees, claiming that Davis did not apply retroactively. The Supreme
Court, in a series of decisions ending with Harper v. Virginia Department of Revenue,
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501 U.S. 1247 (1993), held that Davis applied retroactively and the states must provide
the federal retirees meaningful backward looking relief removing the discrimination, e.g.,
a tax refund or a retroactive increase in the tax on state retirees. In response, the Utah
Supreme Court ordered tax refunds for federal retirees in Brumley v. Utah State Tax
Commission, 868 P.2d 796 (1993), petition for rehearing denied, 868 P.2d 801 (1993).
The case now before this Court reflects the second chapter of Utah's resistance to
the implementation of Davis - a legislative effort to provide, in substance, a rebate to
certain Utah retirees in a manner that continues to discriminate against federal retirees.
The Utah legislature responded to Davis' mandate to eliminate discrimination
between federal and state retirees by eliminating the statutory exemption for state retirees
but, at the same time, offering an effective rebate to affected state retirees by increasing
pension benefits by three percent for the express purpose of offsetting the new state tax
liability.
It is indisputable that the Utah legislature increased state pension benefits in direct
response to the new tax on state retirement income in an effort partially to alleviate the
new tax burden on certain state retirees. The legislature did not even attempt to disguise
the rebate. The title of the new legislation was: "Retirement allowance increase to offset
tax liability." Moreover, the Tax Commission itself, in November, 1989, characterized
the new benefits as a "substantial substitute" for the lost exemption. The increased
pension benefits were clearly and indisputably intended to replace the lost tax exemption,
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and thus constitute tax rebates to selected state retirees. As noted by the Trial Court, "[i]t
is undisputed that the increase in retirement benefits largely offsets the amount of income
tax which an individual Utah retiree would be required to pay." Record of Case No.
010911230 ("Record") at p.340.
Since federal retirees do not receive these tax rebates, the relative situation of
federal and state retirees in Utah remains precisely what it was before Davis — federal
retirees pay full state income tax on their benefits while state retirees pay less than full
state income tax on their benefits because of the rebate.
Richard C. Thompson and Paul C. Jensen, both federal retirees, brought an action
on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated taxpayers against the Utah State Tax
Commission and its Commissioners in an attempt to remedy the unconstitutionally
discriminatory taxation treatment. The Commission and the Commissioners moved to
dismiss the complaint, asserting that the complaint failed to state a claim.

The

Commission and the Commissioners also argued that the Utah State Retirement System
should be added as a party defendant to the lawsuit. The Trial court ordered on August
23, 2002 that the Utah State Retirement System be added as a party and allowed to assert
its own Motion to Dismiss. Record at pp. 230-232. The Utah State Retirement System
was added to the case on August 30, 2002, Record at pp. 233-241 and 265-66, and on
October 9, 2002 filed its own Motion to Dismiss, at which time the Commission and the
Commissioners renewed their prior Motion to Dismiss. Record at pp. 242-264.
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On May 7, 2003 the trial court granted the Utah State Retirement Board's Motion
to Dismiss, Record at pp. 346-355, and final judgment against Taxpayers was entered on
May 13, 2003. Record at pp. 356-57. Taxpayers filed their notice of appeal on June 3,
2003. Record at pp. 368-370.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Davis v. Michigan, 489

U.S. 803, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 103 L.Ed. 891 (1989), determined that the United States
Constitution and 4 U.S.C. §111 permit a state to levy a tax on the retirement benefits paid
to retired federal employees only if the retirement benefits paid to retired state employees
are treated equally for taxation purposes. Record at p. 5.
2.

In Utah, prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Davis, retirement benefits

received by employees who had worked for the federal government were subject to the
state income tax, but retirement benefits received by employees who participated in the
state's retirement system were not. Id.
3.

The Legislature of the State of Utah responded to the Supreme Court's

ruling in Davis by revoking the state income tax exemption for retirement benefits
received by retired employees under the state's retirement system. Id.
4.

The Utah Legislature and Utah Courts considered the unlawful tax

exemption for state retirement income to be a vested right that was contractually
guaranteed. Record at p. 245.

9

5.

Shortly after revoking the exemption, the Legislature, in a 1989 special

session held soon after Davis was decided, enacted a rebate of somewhat less than one
half of the income tax burden imposed on the state retirement income of individuals who
were members of the State Retirement System before January 1, 1989. Record at p. 6.
6.

The Legislature explicitly stated that its purpose in enacting the rebate was

to provide an "increase to offset tax liability," with direct reference to the tax liability
imposed as a result of the Davis decision. Id.
7.

The pension increase was intended as financial assistance for those "retirees

who had just seen their state retirement income tax exemption taken away." Record at p.
246.
8.

The Utah State Tax Commission reviewed and evaluated § 49-1-701 after it

was enacted and, in November, 1989, issued a bulletin acknowledging that the
Legislature enacted §49-1-701 in order "[t]o provide a substantial substitute for the
benefit of tax free pensions..." Record at p. 131.
9.

The express reason for the rebate was, therefore, to restore the unequal

treatment the Supreme Court had ruled unconstitutional in Davis. Record at p. 6.
10.

This rebate is codified in section 49-1-701 of the Utah Code and is

provided by increasing by three percent (3%) the retirement allowance of those members
of the Utah State Retirement System whose benefits became taxable as a result of the
Davis decision. Id.
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11.

The additional pension payment is funded by appropriation of tax dollars to

the retirement fund in order to permit the retirement fund to make the additional
payments when the affected employees retire. Record at pp. 248-249.
12.

The Utah Legislature requires the cost of the additional pension payments

to be reported "separately from the costs of the other benefits." Record at p. 249.
13.

The Legislature failed to enact any similar payment or rebate for

individuals such as Taxpayers who participate in federal retirement systems and who
receive benefits from those systems. Record at p. 6.
14.

Taxpayers are individuals who have retired from service for the federal

government and reside in the State of Utah. Record at p. 3.
15.

Taxpayers paid income taxes to the State of Utah on their retirement

benefits from the federal government for the years 1999 through 2000 inclusive. Record
at p. 6.
16.

Taxpayers overpaid income tax to the State of Utah to the extent of the

impermissible tax assessed upon them. Record at p. 7.
17.

Taxpayers filed amended tax returns on their own behalf and on behalf of

the Class for the years 1999 to and including 2000 pursuant to section 59-10-529 of the
Utah Code to obtain refunds of the overpayments they made. Id.
18.

The Utah State Tax Commission has refused to grant the requested refunds.

Id.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989), and its progeny
established beyond dispute that a tax exemption for state, but not federal, retirement
income is discriminatory and unlawful. It is also beyond reasonable dispute that a full or
partial rebate of additional taxes paid by state, but not federal, retirees following removal
of the unlawful tax exemption is equally discriminatory and unlawful. This is true even if
the rebate is disguised as an increase in state retirement benefits. To argue otherwise is to
exalt form over substance. A state may not do indirectly what it cannot lawfully do
directly.1 The State of Utah chose to replace a discriminatory tax exemption with an
alternate form of payment. The Taxpayers respectfully submit that the State of Utah
must be held to a higher standard. By perpetuating discriminatory treatment against
federal retirees, Utah remains in violation of the constitutional protections enunciated in
Davis.

1

The Supreme Court has emphasized that discrimination that is unlawful in substance
cannot be condoned even if it appears proper in form. In West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994), in the context of the Commerce Clause, the Supreme
Court struck down a facially even-handed Massachusetts state tax because
Massachusetts, by "conjoining a tax and a subsidy," effectively granted tax rebates to instate dairy farmers. The Supreme Court noted that its Commerce Clause jurisprudence is
not controlled by "the form by which a state erects barriers to commerce;.. . [the Clause]
forbids discrimination, whether forthright or ingenious.'Ttf. at 201. The issue in each
case is whether the statute, "whatever its name may be, will in practical operation work
discrimination against interstate commerce." Id.
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Courts in other states have encountered similar challenges to states' creative
attempts to evade Davis. In each instance in which a state's highest court has directly
addressed the issue, the court has refused to allow the state to accomplish indirectly what
was constitutionally forbidden if done directly. As succinctly stated by the Oregon
Supreme Court in Vogl v. Department of Revenue, 960 P.2d 373, 379 (Or. 1998), "in the
world of intergovernmental tax immunity, substance does count."

The Taxpayers

respectfully submit that substance also counts in the State of Utah.
The State of Utah perpetuated its violation of federal constitutional law when it
replaced a discriminatory tax exemption for state retirees with a discriminatory increase
in pension benefits to mimic, at least in part, the economic benefits of the illegal tax
exemption.

The state has, in substance and effect, returned or rebated a substantial

portion of the additional taxes paid by state retirees following repeal of the illegal tax
exemption, thus perpetuating discrimination against federal retirees. Utah's selective
increase in state retirement benefits in response to Davis.

2

The trial court erred in

Reality - and not appearance - governs the determination of a discriminatory taxing
scheme. Three years after Davis, the United States Supreme Court unanimously struck
down a Kansas system that taxed the benefits received from the United States by military
retirees but did not tax the benefits received by retired state and local government
employees. Barker v. Kansas, 503 U.S. 594 (1992). The Court rejected the State's
efforts to suggest significant differences between military and state retirees as a basis for
the discrimination . The court looked rather to the reality of the state's action, finding
that the "state's articulated rationale is not, in fact, the basis for the disparate treatment,
but only a cloak for discrimination against federally funded benefits." Id. at 604-05.
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focusing on the form of the tax rebate rather than the substance, and its order dismissing
the Taxpayers' Complaint should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I.

UTAH'S DISCRIMINATORY TAX REBATE SYSTEM VIOLATES THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S DA VIS DECISION
The United States has conditionally consented to state taxation of federal

employees. 4 U.S.C. § 111. However, such taxation is permitted only if the state tax
system "does not discriminate" against federal "officers and employees" based on the
source of the pay. Id. Retired federal employees living in Utah brought this action, both
individually and as representatives of all others similarly situated, against the Utah State
Tax Commission and its individual Commissioners in their official capacities to remedy
an unlawful rebate by the State of Utah that discriminates against retired federal
employees in favor of retired state employees based on the source of the payment. This
rebate violates both the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity and 4
U.S.C. §111.
Utah, for many years prior to 1989, exempted from state taxation retirement
benefits paid by state and local governments.

However, the state taxed retirement

benefits of federal employees. The Supreme Court in Davis held that if a state taxes state
and local government retirees differently than it taxes federal retirees, the state violates
the United States Constitution as well as 4 U.S.C. § 111. The Supreme Court in Davis
evaluated a Michigan statutory tax exemption for state and local employees' retirement
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benefits that did not apply to federal retirees' retirement benefits. The Supreme Court
held that Michigan's taxing regime violated both the United States Constitution and 4
U.S.C. § 111 and struck down Michigan's statutory exemption for retirement benefits
paid to participants in state and local retirement systems.
Notwithstanding Davis, the Utah Tax Commission refused to grant refunds to
federal employees who had paid illegal taxes, arguing that Davis did not apply
retroactively.

The Supreme Court of Utah, however, overruled the Commission in

Brumley v. Utah Tax Commission, 868 P.2d 796 (1993). The Brumley Court ended the
first chapter of Utah's resistance to Davis by upholding a district court order of refunds to
federal retirees.3
This case addresses Utah's second chapter of resistance to Davis. The Supreme
Court issued a "mandate of equal treatment" to federal and state retirees. Davis, 489 U.S.
at 818. The Court noted that future discrimination against federal retirees could be ended
by either exempting both federal and state retirement benefits from tax or by taxing both:
appellant's claim could be resolved either by extending the
tax exemption to retired federal employees (or to all retired
employees), or by eliminating the exemption for retired state
and local government employees.

3

The court also sustained the district court's denial of the Tax Commission's motion to
dismiss based on the taxpayers' alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The
Utah Supreme Court found such exhaustion unnecessary because the Commission could
not decide the critical legal issues.
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Davis, 489 U.S. at 818. The first option, extending the exemption to federal retirees,
would have cost the state millions of dollars annually in lost tax revenues. The second
option, repealing the exemption enjoyed by state retirees, would have reduced the
benefits promised to state retirees.

Either option would undoubtedly have been

unpopular.
Apparently unhappy with either option permitted under Davis, the Utah legislature
adopted a third, unsanctioned option. After facially revoking the exemption for state
retirement income, it simultaneously increased benefits to state retirees who were
members of the retirement system at the time the tax exemption was revoked in an effort
to offset the state retirees' new tax liability, in substance granting a partial rebate of the
new tax liability (the "Rebate"). The purpose of the Rebate is to compensate current and
former state employees who are members of the State Retirement System for the
increased tax liability resulting from the elimination of the tax exemption for state
retirement benefits. Utah does not grant a similar rebate to federal retirees. Because of
the Rebate, state retirees continue, in substance, to enjoy most of the economic benefits
of the unlawful tax exemption while federal retirees continue to pay tax as before. Utah
has thus effectively retained the discrimination held unconstitutional in Davis.
The Rebate is codified in Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701. This statute expressly links
the so-called pension increase to the state retirees' loss of tax exemption on state benefits.
Section 49-1-701 is entitled: "Retirement allowance increase to offset tax liability." The
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statute provides a three percent increase for those state retirees who had been exempt
from tax "but whose allowance has subsequently become subject to that tax." § 49-1-701.
The Utah Tax Commission reviewed and evaluated this statute after it was enacted and,
in November, 1989, issued a bulletin acknowledging that the Legislature enacted §49-1701 in order "[t]o provide a substantial substitute for the benefit of tax free pensions..."
There is, therefore, no question that the purported pension increase is, in effect, a tax
rebate intended to "substantially substitute" for the state retirees' loss of their tax
exemption.

There is also no question that federal retirees do not receive similar

treatment.
Utah was not the only state to attempt this type of unsanctioned "third option" to
avoid remedying the unlawful discrimination.

For example, Montana and Oregon

adopted similar approaches and the courts of last resort in both of those states have
rejected such schemes as unsuccessful attempts to evade the Supreme Court's mandate in
Davis. Indeed, no state court of last resort has reached a contrary result.
The Montana Supreme Court squarely faced and rejected an attempt to evade the
Davis ruling through a selective pension increase to state retirees in Sheehy v. Public
Employees Retirement Division, 864 P.2d 762, 768 (Mont. 1993). The Montana Supreme
Court found that the Montana legislature violated 4 U.S.C. § 111 when it awarded an
"annual retirement adjustment payment" to state retirees at the same time it repealed its

17

tax exemption for state retirement income. Montana argued that the two provisions were
not related. The court found that argument to "def[y] logic:"
[T]he relationship between the tax equalization provisions of
the bill, with their negative impacts on state retirees, and the
adjustment intended to make up, in part, for that equalization
cannot be gain said. The adjustment — while purporting to
be an adjustment to state retirement benefits — is, in fact, an
adjustment to the equalization achieved via the first sections
of Chapter 823. This conclusion is inescapable given the
inclusion of the adjustment in, and as part of, the tax
equalization program. No other interpretation of these two
portions of Chapter 823 comports with our duty to construe
statutes in a reasonable manner.
Sheehy, 864 P.2d at 768. The Montana court found the new adjustment was not a
"legitimate increase in retirement benefits" but was "intended to make up, in part," for
the new tax liability placed on state retirees. Id. at 768. It "is a partial tax rebate
denominated otherwise in an attempt to evade the requirements of federal law." Id. In
Utah, there is no question that the repeal of the tax rebate and the increased pension
benefits are related; the statute expressly so provides.
The Oregon Supreme Court reached a similar result - rejecting a pension increase
that was demonstrated, in purpose and effect, to be a discriminatory tax rebate. The
Oregon legislature initially elected one of the Dam-sanctioned cures to discrimination by
repealing the tax exemption for state retirees5 benefits. State retirees in Oregon filed suit
and successfully argued that the state had breached its contractual obligation to state
retirees by repealing their statutory exemption. Oregon responded to that problem by
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increasing pension payments "to compensate for damages suffered by members of [the
state retirement system] . . . by reason of subjecting benefits . . . to Oregon personal
income taxation." Vogl v. Dep't. of Revenue, 960 P.2d 373, 380 (Or. 1998). Oregon's
new pension increase was challenged as an illegally discriminatory rebate. The Oregon
Supreme Court began its analysis of this question by noting that it had earlier held "both
explicitly and implicitly that a tax rebate program aimed solely at state retirement system]
members would violate Davis."

Id. at 379. The court concluded that "the benefit

increase [under review] is, in substance, a tax rebate." Id. at 381. The new benefit
"substantially eliminates the tax on [state retirement system] benefits [by granting the tax
rebate], without extending the same favorable tax treatment to federal retirement
benefits." Id. at 382. The court found:
The increase purports to give [state retirement system]
retirees what they were promised, viz., tax-free retirement
benefits. Because the retirees were taxed, the increase is the
cure. And a cure for being overtaxed is a rebate. The
increase provided by Oregon Laws 1995, chapter 569, is just
that — a rebate. Calling it increased compensation does not
change its nature.
Id. at 379-80 (emphasis in original). Because of the discriminatory impact of this
rebate, the federal retirees were granted a refund of state income taxes paid. The
same is clearly true in Utah. Because members of the Utah State Retirement
System faced a new tax by reason of the legislative revocation of their exemption,
the "increase to offset tax liability" granted by § 49-1-701 was the cure. Money
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provided to offset a tax liability is a rebate. Davis cannot be avoided by hiding a
discriminatory tax rebate in code sections relating to retirement plans. The Utah
Rebate, like those of Montana and Oregon, violates Davis and is unlawful.
II.

THERE IS NO LITMUS TEST FOR DETERMINING WHETHER AN
INCREASE IN BENEFITS PERPETUATES DISCRIMINATORY TAX
TREATMENT; ALL RELEVANT FACTORS MUST BE ANALYZED TO
DETERMINE LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND ACTUAL EFFECTS
In attempting to distinguish the persuasive authority of Sheehy and Vogl, the

Commission and the Retirement System argued to the trial court, and the trial court
erroneously decided, that unlawful discrimination could not be found in the absence of
certain specified factors present in those cases. The intent and import of Sheehy and Vogl
cannot be so easily dismissed. In each case, the court examined the statutes at issue and
all factors deemed relevant to a determination of legislative intent and substantive effect.
In each case, it was determined that the challenged statute was improperly designed to,
and effectively did, replace some of the economic benefits of the unlawful tax
exemptions with increased retirement benefits.
The Sheehy and Vogl courts identified several factors relevant to their analyses and
their conclusions that the legislatures intended to, and did, replace discriminatory tax
exemptions with discriminatory partial tax rebates disguised as increased pension
benefits. An analysis of all factors relevant to this case demonstrates the same intent and
effect with respect to the "increased benefits" granted by Utah to selected state retirees in
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response to Davis. The increased pension benefits serve in substance and effect as a
partial rebate of the increased taxes stemming from repeal of the unlawful tax exemption.
A.

The Montana Supreme Court Examined All Relevant Factors In Order to
Determine the Actual Legislative Intent and the Substantive Impacts.

The defendants in this case, and the trial court below, attempted to distinguish
Sheehy on the ground that the increased pension benefits in that case were granted only to
Montana residents and were funded by direct appropriations from the general fund.
Sheehy's import cannot properly be ignored on such a superficial basis. The Sheehy court
examined all factors that it considered relevant to determine the actual import and intent
of the challenged statute.4 The court was concerned with the legislature's true intent, as
opposed to the appearance the legislature attempted to create.
The Montana Supreme Court found that the title and the content of the legislation
confirmed that the purported increase in retirement benefits was, in substance, partial

4

Among the factors analyzed by the Sheehy Court were the following: (i) the increase in
pension benefits was clearly related to, and enacted in response to and partial replacement
of, the discriminatory tax exemption; (ii) the increased benefits were not extended to all
retirees, but only to those living in Montana; and (iii) the increased benefits were funded
through appropriations from the general fund, in a different manner than other retirement
benefits. An examination of similar factors in this case confirms the same conclusion the increased Utah pension benefits were intended as a partial rebate of additional taxes
incurred due to the lost tax exemption. The Utah Rebate is: (1) undeniably related to,
and enacted in direct response to and in partial replacement of, the discriminatory tax
exemption; (2) not extended to all retirees, but only to those who once enjoyed, and
subsequently lost, the unlawful tax exemption; (3) indirectly funded from the general
fund; and (4) calculated, adjusted and reported separately from all other pension
contributions and payments.
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compensation for, or a partial "rebate" of, the additional taxes paid by state retirees as a
result of the loss of the unlawful tax exemption. The Court also found that the legislation
lacked certain attributes of a legitimate general increase in retirement benefits.
According to the Montana Supreme Court, these factors demonstrated that "the
adjustment is a partial tax rebate denominated otherwise in an attempt to evade the
requirements of federal law." 864 P.2d at 768.
B.

The Oregon Supreme Court Also Examined All Relevant Factors to
Determine Actual Intent and Effects.

The defendants and trial court in this case attempted to distinguish Vogl because
the Oregon Supreme Court noted the close correlation in that case between the amount of
the pension increase and the lost exemption, a reading that misapprehends and misapplies
Oregon case law. Two Oregon Supreme Court cases clearly demonstrate that court's
recognition of the need for a careful examination of all relevant factors in order to
determine whether a challenged pension increase is in substance an unlawful tax rebate.
In Ragsdale v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 1348 (Ore. 1995), the Oregon
Supreme Court analyzed a number of factors in an effort to determine whether the
increased pension benefits at issue in that case were, in effect, discriminatory tax rebates.
After reviewing the available information, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had not
sufficiently demonstrated that the pension increases were intended to, or in effect did, act
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as a substitute for the illegal tax rebate.5 A few years later, in Vogl v. Dep 't. of Revenue,
960 P.2d 373, 380 (Or. 1998), by contrast, a similar analysis of all relevant factors led the
same court to conclude that the challenged pension increase in that case was in fact
discriminatory and unlawful.6 In each case, the Oregon Supreme Court undertook an

5

The Ragsdale court focused primarily on the following factors: (1) the pension increase
was not shown to be part of the State's system of taxation; (2) there was no correlation,
directly or indirectly, between state tax liability and increased retirement benefits; (3) the
increased benefits were funded by the retirement trust fund and not the general fund; and
(4) the increase in benefits was provided to all state retirees, based on years of service.
The Oregon court acknowledged that certain aspects of the challenged legislation
suggested an illegal tax rebate but concluded, on balance, that the benefits had not been
shown to be discriminatory. Here, by contrast, the pension increase is clearly and
expressly part of Utah's tax code. Moreover, although there is no direct correlation to
Utah tax rates, an indirect correlation exists in that the selective increase in benefits is
payable only to those who once enjoyed the benefits of the unlawful tax exemption.
Finally, the Utah Rebate is indirectly funded by the general fund, and is reported,
analyzed and funded in a manner separate and distinct from legitimate pension benefits.
6

The primary factors considered by the Court in Vogl included: (i) the increased benefits
were tied directly into Oregon's income tax statutes; (ii) the increase applied only to
income attributable to service prior to repeal of the unlawful tax exemption; (iii) retirees
had no contractual right to the increased benefits; (iv) the benefits were intended as
partial compensation for damages suffered by state retirees as a result of the repeal of the
unlawful tax exemption. In addition, the court noted that the Oregon statute required that
the increase be reported separately from other pension benefits. An analysis of similar
factors in this case leads to the same conclusion for the Utah statute: (1) The Rebate is
clearly part of Utah's taxation statutes; (2) the Rebate is selectively available only to
those state retirees who once enjoyed the illegal tax exemption; (3) while the Board and
Tax Commission admit that the Rebate is a vested contractual right, the Utah statute does
not create contractual rights for all retirees, but only for certain retirees; (4) the Utah
Rebate was clearly and admittedly intended as compensation for a portion of the damages
suffered by state retirees as a result of the repeal of the tax exemption; and (5) Utah
statutes require special and unique reporting requirements for the Rebate and prohibit
inclusion of the Rebate in comparative studies.
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analysis of all relevant circumstances surrounding the increase in order to glean actual
legislative intent and actual impacts of the purported increase.
Among the various factors examined in Vogl was that the increased pension
benefits were calculated in a manner that closely correlated with the lost tax exemption.
This factor was cited by the trial court below in distinguishing Vogl

However, the

relevance of this factor was misapprehended by the trial court. The importance of the
way in which the increased benefits were calculated in Vogl was what it communicated
about the legislature's intent in enacting the increase. The Vogl court looked at the
correlation between the increased benefits and the tax rate as a strong indication of the
legislature's intent to return (or rebate) a portion of the additional taxes caused by the loss
of the tax exemption. The Vogl court confirmed the proper relevance of this factor by
noting, "as the state moves closer to replacing lost net income on a dollar for dollar basis,
the fact that the increase is in fact a tax rebate ... becomes more apparent." 960 P.2d at
380.
The Vogl court correctly observed that the more closely the legislature attempts to
replace the exact amount of lost income the easier it is to discern the legislature's true
intent. However, the court did not suggest that failure to fully rebate the new tax would
have made the pension increase lawful. In fact, neither the 1995 statute at issue in Vogl
nor the 1991 statute at issue in Ragsdale replaced dollar for dollar the amount of money
state retirees lost as a result of the repeal of the exemption. The correlation of the rebate
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and the tax, along with all other factors considered by the court, demonstrated the true
intent and import of the increased benefits.

The Vogl court's analysis was clearly

designed to determine what the legislature actually intended, not to establish a litmus test
as erroneously assumed by the trial court.
In summary, state supreme courts that have analyzed increased pension benefits
granted in response to Davis have concerned themselves with determining the true
substance and intent of the legislation, as opposed to the form. They analyzed all factors
deemed relevant to that determination; they did not lay out bright line tests. A similar
analysis of relevant factors in this case compels the conclusion that the Utah statute, like
the Montana statute and the 1995 Oregon statute, was intended to replace (or rebate) a
portion of the new taxes imposed on state retirees through repeal of the discriminatory tax
exemption. As cogently explained by the Vogl court, compensation designed to replace a
lost tax exemption is a tax rebate, no matter what you call it:
"The increase purports to give ... retirees what they were promised, viz, tax-free
retirement benefits. Because the retirees were taxed, the increase [in pension
benefits] is the cure. And a cure for being overtaxed is a rebate. ... Calling it
increased compensation does not change its nature." 960 P.2d at 381.

7

A primary reason that the Vogl court focused attention on the way the pension increase
was calculated was to distinguish Ragsdale. Most of the factors analyzed in Ragsdale
were also present in Vogl One of the major distinguishing factors was the absence in
Ragsdale of any "direct or indirect" correlation between state tax obligations and
increased retirement benefits. Ragsdale, 895 P.2d at 1354. In Vogl, the court found this
missing correlation, in part because of the manner in which the pension increase was
calculated.
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III.

THE FACTORS RELEVANT TO THIS CASE CONFIRM THAT THE
UTAH LEGISLATURE INTENDED TO PARTIALLY REBATE THE
ADDITIONAL TAXES PAID BY CERTAIN STATE RETIREES AS A
RESULT OF THE REPEAL OF THE UNLAWFUL TAX EXEMPTION.
The Utah Legislature admittedly intended to, and did, enact legislation to replace

or rebate a portion of the additional taxes paid by those state retirees who had lost the
benefit of the unlawful tax exemption as a result of Davis. A summary of relevant factors
(identified and supported in the Statement of the Facts, above, and explained in more
detail below) that demonstrate this undeniable intent and effect is as follows:
•

The Legislature considered the tax exemption as a vested right for those
who were members of the system prior to January 1, 1989, that could not be
removed without providing a substantial substitute for that benefit;

•

The Legislature deprived the pre-1989 members of their vested rights by
repealing the tax exemption, thus increasing the taxes they must pay;

•

The Legislature attempted to provide a substantial replacement for the
vested right that had been lost by increasing payments to pre-1989
members to offset (or partially rebate) the increased taxes;

•

The payments authorized by the Legislature were not made to all members
of the retirement system, but only to those who experienced an increase in
taxes as a result of the repealed exemption;

•

the Legislature explicitly acknowledged that the increased payment was
intended to offset, in part, the increased taxes that pre-1989 members were

26

required to pay; and
•

The increased benefits designed to offset increased taxes are funded,
reported and analyzed separately from all other pension benefits.

A.

The Increase in Utah's Pension Benefits was Enacted to Compensate
Certain State Retirees for the Loss of Vested Rights,

The Utah Legislature and Utah Courts considered the unlawful tax exemption for
state retirement income to be a vested right that was contractually guaranteed. When the
Legislature breached its contract with certain members of the state Retirement System by
repealing the tax exemption (as opposed to honoring that obligation and extending the
discriminatory tax exemption to federal retirees), it attempted to remedy its breach by
making additional payments to offset the increased taxes paid by certain state retirees.
The statute is thus entitled a "[retirement allowance increase to offset tax liability," and
the state Tax Commission confirmed that the increase was enacted in order "[t]o provide
a substantial substitute for the benefit of tax free pensions...." [UTAH TAX COMMISSION
BULLETIN

issued November 11, 1989] The increase was thus clearly intended as partial
o

compensation for the State's breach of contract.

The pension increase was intended as

financial assistance for those retirees who had just seen their state retirement income tax

8

Significantly, the state did not fully remedy its admitted breach of contract, leaving state
retirees only partially compensated for the damages they have suffered. An appropriate
proceeding to recover those damages will presumably be pursued in a separate case.
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exemption taken away. This is equivalent to the Oregon legislature's intent in Vogl that
the pension increase compensate for similar damages.
B.

The Increased Pension Benefits are Directly Correlated With State Retirees'
Individual Income Tax Obligations.

The payment at issue here is directly correlated with state retirees' income tax
obligations. Although the amount of the increase is not calculated with reference to state
income tax rates as was done in Vogl, the additional payment was targeted only to those
members of the state retirement system who had enjoyed, but then lost, the benefits of the
unlawful tax exemption, and who had suffered an increase in state income taxes as a
result.

Other members were never entitled to the tax exemption and thus did not

experience an increase in taxes as a result of the repeal. Those retires do not receive the
extra payment. The payment is thus directly related to state retirees' state income tax
obligations.
C.

The Legislature Intended the Increased Benefits as a Rebate of a Portion of
the Increased Taxes Resulting From Repeal of the Tax Exemption.

The Legislature explicitly acknowledged that the purpose of the payment was to
reduce the taxes paid by state retirees who lost the promised exemption. The payment,
according to the Legislature, is made for the express purpose of "offsetting [an increased]
tax liability." The Legislature's intent is clear. The payment is designed to rebate a
portion of the additional taxes that state retirees were required to pay as a result of losing
their discriminatory, but vested, tax exemption.
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D,

The Increased Pension Benefits are Funded From General Tax Revenues
and are Reported and Analyzed Separately from All Other Pension
Benefits.

The additional pension payment is funded by appropriation of tax dollars to the
retirement fund in order to permit the retirement fund to make the additional payments
when the affected employees retire. Thus, the payment is paid to the retirement fund
which has a statutory duty to ensure that the money is preserved for the purpose of making
additional payments to eligible retirees.

The additional payment promised by the

Legislature to reduce state retirees' tax burden is funded with state tax dollars.
Other aspects of the purported pension increase also confirm that the Legislature
did not intend this additional payment as a legitimate increase in pension benefits. The
cost of the additional payments must be reported separately from the costs of all other
benefits.

If this additional payment were simply a general or legitimate increase in

benefits, the increase would be reported and analyzed as part of all pension benefits.
Similarly, the legislative prohibition against including the Rebate in comparative
studies of public employment benefits shows that the increased payments to selective
state retirees are not simply increased pension benefits.

Tellingly, the Board

acknowledged to the trial court that, if the Rebate were included in such comparisons, it
would "artificially inflate the value of the employees' compensation." [Record at p. 249]
Comparisons of retirement compensation can be "artificially inflated" only if the Rebate
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is not a legitimate increase in pension benefits. A legitimate increase in benefits would
not reflect artificial inflation.9
An analysis of all relevant factors compels the conclusion that the Utah
Legislature intended to, and effectively did, authorize a partial rebate of the increased tax
liability suffered by certain state retirees following revocation of the discriminatory tax
exemption. The discriminatory tax rebate cannot stand.
IV.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN DA VIS DOES
NOT CONDONE STATE PERPETUATION OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST FEDERAL EMPLOYEES IN A DIFFERENT FORM.
The defendants argued below, and the trial court in this case (as well as a trial

court in another state10) concluded, that the Davis opinion somehow condones form over
substance in analyzing state responses to unlawful discrimination against federal retirees.
Such a startling conclusion is not supported by logic or by the Davis opinion.
The Davis opinion identifies only two ways that a state can eliminate the illegal
tax discrimination: exempt both federal and state retirement benefits from tax, or tax

9

The defendants point out that the legislative restrictions on reporting and comparative
studies were added in subsequent legislative sessions. It is not relevant whether the
restrictions were included in the initial legislation or added subsequently. The original
legislation is explicit in expressing legislative intent that the Rebate was intended to
return a portion of the taxes that would be incurred by some retirees following repeal of
the discriminatory tax exemption. The subsequent legislation simply confirms this intent
by insisting that the Rebate be reported and analyzed separately from all other pension
payments.
"Almeter v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 53 Va. Cir. 429, 2000 WL 1687589 (Va.
Cir. Ct. 2000).
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both. Davis, 489 U.S. at 818. The defendants, however, attempt to twist arguments
contained in a dissenting opinion, combined with responsive dicta in a footnote in the
majority opinion, into a Supreme Court sanction for states to perpetuate unlawful
discrimination against federal employees by simply disguising it in the form of a benefit
increase, or by avoiding any adverse impacts on the federal treasury.11 Such an argument
flies in the face of the Court's reasoning in Davis, exalts form over substance, and is
inconsistent with established Supreme Court law. E.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994); Barker v. Kansas, 503 U.S. 594 (1992). The substance
- not the form - of the legislative action is controlling, and the impact on the federal
treasury is irrelevant to the issue of unlawful discrimination.
The tendency illustrated by the defendants in this case to grasp for illogical
answers to Davis is perhaps understandable given the indisputable fact that a state has the
right to set (and increase) pension benefits for state employees. If the State of Utah were

11

A dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens in Davis asserts that a state "may always
compensate in pay or salary for what it assesses in taxes" and "has an unquestionable
right to provide ... increased retirement benefits." 489 U.S. at 824 (citation and footnote
omitted). Without challenging (or accepting) Justice Stevens' assertions, the majority
opinion includes a footnote in response to the dissent in order to illustrate one of the
perceived pernicious impacts of the specific discriminatory statute at issue in that case,
i.e., adverse economic impacts on the federal treasury. 489 U.S. at 815 n. 4. It takes an
astonishing leap of logic to conclude that this footnote dicta condones a state disguising a
discriminatory and unlawful tax exemption in another form, or discriminating against
federal employees so long as there is no adverse impact on the federal treasury. Neither
conclusion can withstand logical scrutiny or the clear import of the majority opinion in
Davis.

31

to elect to increase pension benefits for state employees for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, federal retirees would have no complaint and would not demand
similar payments. That, however, is not the case here. It is simply not useful in this case
to engage in a debate over whether a different conclusion might be reached if the intent
and effect of the Utah Rebate had been better disguised. Here, the intent and effect are
clear and indisputable. The discriminatory impact of the unlawful tax exemption was
intentionally perpetuated by the State of Utah and must be eliminated.
CONCLUSION
The express intent and actual effect of the Utah Legislature in adopting Utah Code
Ann. § 49-1-701 was to return to state retirees a portion of the new taxes they incurred by
virtue of the repeal of an unlawful tax exemption. A facial review of the statute, and
particularly when considered in the context of all relevant circumstances, compels the
conclusion that the State of Utah has granted a discriminatory tax rebate of a substantial
portion of the increased taxes resulting from the repeal of the discriminatory tax
exemption outlawed by Davis. A discriminatory tax rebate is no more lawful than a
discriminatory tax exemption. Substance prevails over form. Federal retirees are entitled
to relief.
For all of the reasons set forth above, the trial court erred in finding that the
Taxpayers did not state a claim for relief and in dismissing the Taxpayers5 Complaint.
The court's ruling granting Appellees' Motion to Dismiss should be reversed.
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ADDENDUM "A

/ ^ A * ->
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

Sy

—
,

RICHARD C. THOMPSON et. al.,
Plaintiffs,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO. 010911230

vs.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, et.
al.,

JUDGE RONALD E. NEHRING

Defendants.

This matter is before me on defendants1 Motion to Dismiss the
plaintiffs' complaint.

For the reasons stated below, I grant

defendants' motion.
On September

19, 1989, the Utah legislature made state

retirement income as well as federal retirement income taxable,
while at the same time increasing pension benefits to state
retirees by 3%.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 (1998) .

Plaintiffs,

retirees who were employed by the federal government, challenge the
state's decision to increase pension benefits to state retirees,
claiming that the benefits are merely a replacement for the lost
tax exemption and essentially constitute tax rebates to State
retirees.
A full understanding of the nature of plaintiffs' claims
requires a historical explanation.

Prior to 1989, 21 state

exempted recipients of state retirement benefits from income tax
while imposing income tax on the benefits of federal retirees. In
1989, the United States Supreme Court ended this practice, finding

THOMPSON V. UTAH
STATE TAX COMM.

PAGE 2
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that it constituted unlawful tax discrimination in violation of
federal law and the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity.
Davis v Michigan, 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
Utah, like many sister states, responded to the Supreme
Court's edict by amending its statute to make state retirement
benefits taxable. The legislature also increased pension benefits
to state retirees by 3%. Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 (1998).

It is

undisputed that the increase in retirement benefits largely offsets
the amount of income tax which an individual Utah retiree would be
required to pay.
Plaintiffs contend that Utah's response to the mandate of
Davis was nothing more than a sham that merely perpetuated the
unlawful discrimination which existed pre-Davis where

federal

retirees pay full state income tax on their benefits while state
retirees pay less than full state income tax on their benefits
because of the rebate.
I

have

reviewed

the

reported

cases

addressing

challenges to legislative responses to Davis.

similar

See, Sheehv v

Association of Montana Retired Public Employees, 864 P.2d 786
(Mont. 1993), Ragsdale v Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 1348
(1995), Vocrl v Department of Revenue, 960 P.2d 373 (Or. 1997),
Almeter v Virginia Department of Taxation, 53 Va. Cir. 429 (2000)
cert denied.

Irrespective of outcome, these cases recognize that
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the Davis court did not foreclose, and in fact anticipated, a
state's ability to respond to the court's holding by increasing
benefits to its retirees.

Those cases which invalidated, as

violative of Davis, increases in state retiree benefits, did so
only

because

the

benefit

increases

incorporated

additional

provisions which made transparent the true and improper nature of
the response

creating a tax rebate.

Specifically, in Sheehy the Montana Supreme Court concluded
that Montana's response to Davis was actually a

discriminatory

partial tax rebate that improperly favored state retirees "living
in Montana based solely on the source of their retirement income."
864 P. 2d 762, 768 (1993) . Further evidence of a tax rebate was the
fact that Montana's funding for the adjustment was statutorily
appropriated from the general fund and not funded by investment
income produced by the retirement fund itself.

Id. at 768.

Similarly, in Vogl it was determined that Oregon's 1995
statutory

increase to the Public Employees Retirement

System

("PERS") benefits to compensate for "injuries" arising out of the
taxation of the PERS benefits was in violation of Davis. 960 P. 2d
373 (1997) . The Vogl Court ultimately concluded that the increase
in PERS benefits was a tax rebate because the relationship between
the lost exemption and the 1995 increase was one of "purported
legal equivalence."

Id. at 3 81.
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Upon consideration of these cases, I conclude that Utah's
statutory

response to Davis

is untainted by any of the above

mentioned provisions from which one could reasonably conclude that
the benefit increase was, in fact, a tax rebate.
It would be disingenuous for me to suggest that the timing and
content of the amendments to Utah Code Ann., Section 49-1-701
(1998), did not reflect our legislature's desire to accomplish by
lawful

means

impermissibly

the

result

which

discriminatory.

the
The

Davis
timing

court
and

found
intent

to
of

legislature's response to Davis is not, however, controlling.

be
the
Of

primary importance is the plain language of the statutory product
of the legislature's response to Davis. The statute itself applies
to all members whose retirement allowance was previously exempt
from tax, pre-Davis,
subject to that tax."

but whose allowance has "subsequently become
Specifically, a member shall receive:

(a) the administrator shall calculate the member's retirement
allowance pursuant to the formula governing the system
from which the member retired;
(b) the administrator shall then increase the allowance
calculated under Subsection (2)(a) by 3%; and;
(c) the adjusted retirement allowance under Subsection (2)(b)
is the new basis upon which any future adjustments to
benefits are made
UCA § 49-11-701 (2002)1.
Additionally, under subsection (6),
]

The 2002 amendment, effective March 27, 2002, renumbered
this section, formerly referred to as § 49-1-701.

1M-L
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(a)

[t]he retirement board shall annually certify the
contribution rate necessary for each system to comply
with this section and may adopt rules to administer this
section.
(b) [t]his contribution rate shall be reported separately from
the total contribution rate necessary to fund the systems
on an actuarially sound basis and may not be used in
comparative studies of public employee benefits.
UCA § 49-11-701 (2002).
A close look at these statutory provisions indicates that the
language

betrays

no

discriminatory

content.

First,

the

3%

adjustment is given to all retirees who were members of the system.
There is no distinction between retirees located in the state of
Utah and those located out of state.

Essentially, every eligible

retiree who retired on or after January 1, 1989 received the 3%
increase.

UCA § 49-1-701(1)(3)(1998). Second, the statute itself

evidences no attempt to coordinate the 3% benefit with the income
tax rates or structure as found under Utah Code Ann, Title 59.
Finally, distinguishing itself from Sheehy, the plain language
shows that the legislature does not fund the 3% adjustment via
direct

legislative

retirees.

UCA

appropriation

§ 49-1-701(6).

of

tax

dollars

Ultimately,

to

eligible

the total cost is

recognized as a direct part of the total employees' compensation
package.
This statutory analysis, coupled with the Davis court's clear
anticipation

of

the

Utah

legislature's

response,

through

its

«•**»*"*
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holding, warrants the conclusion that plaintiffs1 claim must fail
as a matter of law and defendant's motion is hereby granted.
In view of the foregoing, I need not reach the other arguments
advance by defendant in aid of its motion.
Defendant's counsel shall prepare an Order consistent with
this Minute Entry.

Dated this

ty^?

day of April, 2 003.
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foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this dj
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Gary Dodge
Kevin W. Bates
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Kevin A. Howard
Attorney for Defendant Utah State Retirement Board
560 E 200 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
John C. McCarrey
Timothy A. Bodily
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorney for Defendants
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
RICHARD C. THOMPSON et. al.,
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 010911230

vs.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
et. al.,

Judge Ronald E. Nehring

Defendants.
This matter came before the Court for oral argument on
August 20, 2002, pursuant to the Motion to Dismiss of the Utah
State Tax Commission Defendants.

On August 23, 2002, the Court

entered an Order joining the State Retirement Board.

Subsequent

to that order, Plaintiffs, Tax Commission Defendants, and the
State Retirement Board agreed on a schedule and filed memoranda
to supplement the Motion to Dismiss that was heard on August 23,

_

t *i

2002.

Plaintiffs were represented by Gary Dodge, Kevin W. Bates,

and Mark R. Clements of the law firm of Hatch, James and Dodge.
The Tax Commission was represented by John C. McCarrey and
Timothy A. Bodily, Assistant Attorneys General.

The Utah State

Retirement Board was represented by Kevin A. Howard, Gregory D.
Phillips, Daniel D. Andersen, and David B. Hansen of the law firm
Howard, Phillips and Andersen.
The State Retirement Board joined in the pending Motion to
Dismiss.

After reviewing the supplemental pleadings, the Court

concluded that the oral argument, held on August 20, 2002, was
sufficient and that further oral argument would not aid the Court
in its decision.
Having reviewed the pleadings of the parties submitted prior
to the hearing, and having reviewed the subsequent pleadings
filed by Plaintiffs, the Tax Commission Defendants, and the Utah
State Retirement Board, this case is dismissed pursuant to Rule
12(B)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

For the reasons

stated below, I grant Defendants' motion.
On September 19, 1989, the Utah legislature made state
retirement income as well as federal retirement income taxable,
while at the same time increasing pension benefits to state

2

retirees by 3%.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 (1998).

Plaintiffs,

retirees who were employed by the federal government, challenge
the state's decision to increase pension benefits to state
retirees, claiming that the benefits are merely a replacement for
the lost tax exemption and essentially constitute tax rebates to
State retirees.
A full understanding of the nature of Plaintiffs' claims
requires an historical explanation.

Prior to 1989, 21 states

exempted recipients of state retirement benefits from income tax
while imposing income tax on the benefits of federal retirees.
In 1989, the Unites State Supreme Court ended this practice,
finding that it constituted unlawful tax discrimination in
violation of federal law and the doctrine of intergovernmental
tax immunity.

Davis v. Michigan, 489 U.S. 803 (1989).

Utah, like many sister states, responded to the Supreme
Court's edict by amending its statute to make state retirement
benefits taxable.

The legislature also increased pension

benefits to state retirees by 3%.
(1998).

Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701

It is undisputed that the increase in retirement

benefits largely offsets the amount of income tax which an
individual Utah retiree would be required to pay.

3

Plaintiffs contend that Utah's response to the mandate of
Davis was nothing more than a sham that merely perpetuated the
unlawful discrimination which existed pre-Davis where federal
retirees pay full state income tax on their benefits while state
retirees pay less than full state income tax on their benefits
because of the rebate.
I have reviewed the reported cases addressing similar
challenges to legislative responses to Davis.

See, Sheehv v.

Association of Montana Retired Public Employees, 864 P.2d 786
(Mont. 1993), Raasdale v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 1348
(Or. 1995), Voal v. Department of Revenue, 960. P.2d 373 (Or.
1997), Almeter v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 53 Va. Cir.
429 (2000) cert denied, 122 S.Ct. 202 (Mem.) (2001) .

Irrespective

of outcome, these cases recognize that the Davis Court did not
foreclose, and in fact anticipated, a state's ability to respond
to the Court's holding by increasing benefits to its retirees.
Those cases which invalidated, as violative of Davis, increases
in state retiree benefits, did so only because the benefit
increases incorporated additional provisions which made
transparent the true and improper nature of the response—
creating a tax rebate.

4

Specifically, in Sheehv the Montana Supreme Court concluded
that Montana's response to Davis was actually a discriminatory
partial tax rebate that improperly favored state retirees "living
in Montana based solely on the source of their retirement
income."

Sheehv, 864 P.2d at 768 (1993).

Further evidence of a

tax rebate was the fact that Montana's funding for the adjustment
was statutorily appropriated from the general fund and not funded
by investment income produced by the retirement fund 'itself.

Id.

Similarly, in Vogl, it was determined that Oregon's 1995
statutory increase to the Public Employees Retirement System
("PERS") benefits to compensate for "injuries", arising out of the
taxation of the PERS benefits was in violation of Davis. Vogl,
960 P.2d 373 (1997).

The Vogl court ultimately concluded that

the increase in PERS benefits was a tax rebate because the
relationship between the lost exemption and the 1995 increase was
one of "purported legal equivalence.7' Id. at 381.
Upon consideration of these cases, I conclude that Utah's
statutory response to Davis is untainted by any of the above
mentioned provisions from which one could reasonably conclude
that the benefit increase was, in fact, a tax rebate.
It would be disingenuous for me to suggest that the timing

5

and content of the amendments to Utah Code Ann.

§ 49-1-701

(1998), did not reflect our legislature's desire to accomplish by
lawful means the result which the Davis Court found to be
impermissibly discriminatory.

The timing and intent of the

legislature's response to Davis is not, however, controlling.

Of

primary importance is the plain language of the statutory product
of the legislature's response to Davis.

The statute itself

applies to all members whose retirement allowance was previously
exempt from tax, pre-Davis, but whose allowance has "subsequently
become subject to the tax."

Specifically, a member shall

receive:
(a)

(b)
(c)

the administrator shall calculate the member's
retirement allowance pursuant to the formula
governing the system from which the member
retired;
the administrator shall then increase the
allowance calculated under Subsection (2)(a) by
3%; and
the adjusted retirement allowance under Subsection
(2)(b) is the new basis upon which any future
adjustments to benefits are made.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-701 (2002)K
Additionally, under subsection (6)
(a)

[t]he retirement board shall annually certify the

1

The 2002 amendment, effective March 27, 2002, renumbered
this section, formerly referred to as Section 49-1-701.
6

•*r\

(b)

contribution rate necessary for each system to
comply with this section and may adopt rules to
administer this section,
[t]his contribution rate shall be reported
separately from the total contribution rate
necessary to fund the systems on an actuarially
sound basis and may not be used in comparative
studies of public employee benefits.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-701 (2002).
A close look at these statutory provisions indicates that
the language betrays no discriminatory content.

First, the 3%

adjustment is given to all retirees who were members of the
system.

There is no distinction between retirees located in the

state of Utah and those located out of state.

Essentially, every

eligible retiree who retired on or after January 1, 1989,
received the 3% increase.
(1998).

Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701(1)(3)

Second, the statute itself evidences no attempt to

coordinate the 3% benefit with the income tax rates or structure
as found under Utah Code Ann., Title 59.

Finally, distinguishing

itself from Sheehy, the plain language shows that the legislature
does not fund the 3% adjustment via direct legislative
appropriation of tax dollars to eligible retirees.
Ann. § 49-1-701(6) (1998).

Utah Code

Ultimately, the total cost is

recognized as a direct part of the total employees' compensation
package.
7

This statutory analysis, coupled with the Davis Court's
clear anticipation of the Utah legislature's response, through
its holding, warrants the conclusion that Plaintiffs' claims must
fail as a matter of law, and Defendants' motion is hereby
granted.
In view of the foregoing, I need not reach the other
arguments advanced by Defendants in aid of their motion.

DATED this

t^>

day of

(fc\

n
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